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subordinate to the D's interest arising from the after-acquired property clause. The failure of D's financing statement to include the
after-acquired property clause was held immaterial as the financing
statement gave notice only that there might be a security interest.
Had D had actual notice of P's interest, the after-acquired property
clause would have been void as to P's interest. W. VA. CODE ch.
46, art 9, § 301(1)(b) (Michie Supp. 1963).
The notice filing system is a simplification of protective recording statutes brought about by increased economic endeavor in the
field of credit purchases. Where formerly the security instrument
needed to be recorded in its entirety, now mere notice of its existence on a one-page financing statement will suffice. The requirements of the financing statement are typical of the simplicity
contemplated by the Uniform Commercial Code.
Charles Marion Love III

Wils-Devise of Specific Portion of Property
Held in Cotenancy
D's father attempted by codicil to devise to D a specific portion
or parcel of a tract held as cotenants by D's father and mother.
The residue of his estate was to go to his eight children, including
D. The surviving cotenant failed for seventeen years to object
to the purported devise, and at her death her one-half undivided
interest in the tract passed to the seven surviving children. To
P's action for sale and distribution D asserted the purported devise
from her father as a defense. The trial court ruled that D took
her father's one-half undivided interest in the portion purportedly
devised by the codicil. Held, reversed. The owner of an undivided interest in real property does not have the power to devise
a particular portion of the tract or his interest in that portion.
Mauzy v. Nelson, 131 S.E.2d 389 (W. Va. 1963).
In the principal case the court declared that the testator's purported devise to D "is void and can be given no effect." The rationale was that the mother's interest would have been prejudiced
had the codicil been effective. The testator, having attempted
to devise more than he owned, succeeded in devising nothing.
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In Boggess v. Meredith, 16 W. Va. 1 (1879) the court considered
a conveyance by one cotenant of a portion of the common property
by metes and bounds to a third party. In that case the court recognized that the grantee ". . has rights, which will be considered
by the court in making the partition of the whole tract." Id. at 29.
These rights will be protected in so far as is possible without
prejudice to the nonconveying cotenant. "In making such partition," the court said, "if the parcel . . . can be assigned to the
purchaser as a part or the whole of the share of his grantor
without prejudice to the cotenant of the grantor in the entire tract, the court will so assign it, thereby making the purchaser's title perfect." Id. at 29. The theme of the grantee having
rights in the property conveyed, subject only to the rights of he
grantor's cotenant, was repeated in Oneal v. Stimson, 70 W. Va.
452, 74 S.E. 413 (1912), and Worthington v. Staunton, 16 W. Va.

208 (1880).
The recognition that such a conveyance is not void is not limited
to West Virginia. This recognition is well illustrated by Annot.,
77 A.L.R.2d 1376, 1379 (1961): "The doctrine which now obtains
in most jurisdictions is that... [the grantee is] ... equitably entitled to have the parcel . . . allotted to him ... where that course
can be adopted without injury or prejudice to the interests of the
nonconveying owners." The general principle is that the conveyance will not be given effect if the other cotenant's right to partition is prejudiced. 2 AmBcAN LAw oF PROpEmTY § 6.10 (Casner
ed. 1952).
In Lane v. Malcolm, 141 Ga. 424, 427, 81 S.E. 125, 127 (1914),
the court said the deed ". . . is not void and inoperative and is not
voidable except at the instance of a cotenant." The court in Highland Park Mfg. Co. v. Steele, 235 Fed. 465, 470 (4th Cir. 1916),
took the position that: "The courts permit the deed to so operate
as to effectuate the intention of the parties to it without prejudicing
the right of the other tenants in common."
Though few cases have been uncovered giving the same rights
to a devisee as to a grantee it would seem a fair assumption that
the equitable principles would be as applicable to one as the other.
Since the cases considered have placed no stress on the "... special
equities of the innocent purchaser for value, . . . the basic operation of the equitable partition doctrine would apply to devises as
well as to cases involving deeds." 35 N.C.L. RPv. 431 (1957). 2
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AmanxcAN LAW OF PRoPmrrY, op. cit. supra, § 6.10 takes a similar
position by implication in that the last three cases cited in the
section recognizing the validity of such conveyances are concerned
with devises. Such a position was taken by Broughton v. Millis,
67 S.W.2d 650, 655 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934), where the court considered a devise by a cotenant of a specific portion of the common
estate and said that it would operate ". . . as a conveyance by deed
would operate. . ." where no injustice is done to the other cotenant.

Though the decision in the principal case restricts itself to devises, the language used by the court in its rationale is peculiar
to deeds. The court stated that the codicil is void for having violated a positive rule of law. The rule cited deals with "conveyances" and characterizes the transferor as "grantor" and the transferee as "grantee."
With the touchstone of "prejudice to the nonconveying cotenant"
as a guide, the instant case is seen from a different aspect. Any
prejudice sustained by Ps in the devise from the testator was not as
the testator's cotenants, with rights of partition to be protected,
but was as devisees of the residue of an estate substantially reduced
by the exclusion of the portion claimed by D. Ps, acquiring their
interest in the testator's undivided interest at his death, could not
fulfill one of the requisites of cotenancy, i.e. unity of possession.
2 AIEERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, op. cit. supra, § 6.5.
Ps, having been shown to have no rights as cotenants under the
testator's will, rose again, clothed in interests acquired from their
mother, to play new roles in the same production. The court in the
principal case pointed out that the mother had not lost the right
to challenge the testator's disposition of the common property. The
court further recognized that this right passed to Ps at their mother's
death.
Ps alleged that their rights as heirs of the mother had been
prejudiced by the testator's devise to D. Such a position would have
been precarious had they sought partition in kind, but, seeking sale
and distribution, their position became patently untenable. It is
the cotenant's right to partition which the court seeks to protect.
2 AmCAN LAw OF PRoPERTY, op. cit. supra, § 6.10. Here Ps
claimed a partition in kind would result in inequities and asked
instead that the property be sold and the proceeds divided. It is
difficult to imagine how the Ps would have been prejudiced, as
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heirs of their mother, if the testator's intent had been carried out.
The tract, less D's share, could have been sold to satisfy the interests of the other cotenants. If, however, the portion claimed by D
exceeds the testator's one-half undivided interest in the whole
property, the entire tract would have to be sold to protect the
interests of all parties.
Richard Marion Alker

ABSTRACTS
Corporations-Restraint on Stock Transfers
P and D entered into a stock option agreement whereby it was
agreed that in the event of the death of D, or in the event of his
offering his stock for sale during his life, he would sell and P
would buy all of D's stock in X corporation at one dollar per share.
If the option were not exercised then D had the right to sell without
restriction. They owned all the stock in X corporation. Upon D's
death P tendered one dollar per share to the executors of D's
estate, but the executor refused to sell. The actual value per share
was $1,060. The Orphan's Court of Chester County, Pennsylvania
ordered specific performance. Held, affirmed. The restriction of
sale was not absolute or unreasonable. It was made between mature
members of a close family without over-reaching, fraud or deceit.
The discrepancy between the sale price and the actual value did
not invalidate the agreement. In re Mather's Estate, 410 Pa. 373,
189 A.2d 586 (1963).
In the principal case the dissent argued that the agreement
created an absolute restraint against tranfers because the first
refusal price was nominal in relation to the value of the shares
at the time the arrangement was made. The AvmncA Lw oF
PnoPERTY supports the dissent, stating that the effect of a preemption as a restraint on alienation hinges upon the matter of
price. If the property is required to be offered at a sacrifice price
this is a restraint on alienation because the owner will keep it
rather than sell. 6 A
caIAN LAw oF PnoPE Tar § 26.65 (Casner
ed. 1952).
The problem of restraining alienation of stock, whether by price
or other means, is one of conflict of basic ideas. On the one hand
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